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CASENOTES 145 
PROPERTY-REPLEVIN ACTION-ASSIGNED CERTI-
FICATE OF TITLE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE OWNERSHIP 
Plaintiff insurance company paid the owner of a stolen auto-
mobile full value for his loss, and received in return the certifi-
cate of title with a proper assignment thereon. Later, having 
found the automobile in the possession of the def end ant, a pur-
chaser from a thief,1 plaintiff sued out a writ of replevin with-
1 The party who sold the defendant the car was in the penitentiary 
for car theft. Brief for Appellants, p. 22, State Farm 1\lut. Ins. Co. v. 
Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149, 65 N.W.2d 542 (1954). The valid Nebraska 
certificate of title for the stolen car was obtained by altering the motor 
and serial numbers, obtaining a certificate of registration from Georgia 
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out first obtaining a new certificate of title in its own name. 
Held: because of his failure to obtain a new certificate of title 
in his own name, the plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of 
proving ownership in a replevin action.2 
It is a well-established rule of law that the plaintiff in a 
replevin action must bring the action on the strength of his own 
title, prior possession or right to possession.3 Here, because the 
plaintiff had failed to apply for a new certificate of title "within 
three days after delivery" of the automobile as required by Ne-
braska statute,4 the defendant was able to prove that title re-
mained in the original o'\vner.5 
The Nebraska Automobile Title Act was adopted directly 
from the Ohio statutes. 6 In that state, the supreme court in a 
recent case reviewed its previous decisions and announced the 
rule: " ... where endorsement and delivery of a certificate of 
title for an automobile are made, title passes even though there is 
a failure on the part of the recipient to secure the issuance of a 
which has no title law, and then applying for a Nebraska certificate on the 
basis of the Georgia registration. The altered serial and motor numbers 
listed on this new certificate permitted the certificate to be placed on 
file with the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Division without exposing the fact 
that it was for a stolen car. Sources Personnel and Records, Nebraska 
Motor Vehicle Division. 
2 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149, 65 N.W. 
2d 542 (1954). 
3 Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952); Loyal's 
Auto Service v. Munch, 153 Neb. 628, 45 N.W.2d 913 (1951). 
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-106 (Reissue 1952). The court answered the 
plaintiff's argument that the statute was not applicable in this case be-
cause no delivery was ever made by interpreting the words "within three 
days after delivery" to mean that application for a new certificate of title 
might be made anytime after assignment of the transferor's certificate and 
up to three days after actual delivery of the automobile. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149 at 158, 65 N.W.2d 542 at 
547 (1954). 
u The defendant argued that it is a good defense to an action in re-
plevin to prove title and right of possession in a third person. Brief for 
.Appellees. p. 6, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 
149, 65 N.W.2d 542 (1954). This is a minority rule which the court 
permitted to stand. The weight of authority permits the defendant to 
set up the title of a third person only if he can connect himself with such 
title or has been given this authority by such third person. Fuller v. 
Brownell, 48 Neb. 145, 67 N.W. 6 (1896). 
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149 at 167, 
65 N.W.2d 542 at 552 (1954); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 6290-94 (1945). 
CASENOTES 147 
new certificate in his name."; While that quotation is dictum 
espoused in a case which can be distinguished from the instant 
case,8 its premise is supported by case law from other jurisdic-
tions.9 A recent Utah case,10 for example, held in a similar fact 
situation almost identical with the case at hand that title and 
ownership were duly vested in the plaintiff-assignee although he 
failed to obtain a new certificate of title. Moreover, the Utah 
statute is more restrictive than the Nebraska statute since it pro-
hibits moving the car on a highway before a certificate of title 
has been issued or applied for.11 
The Nebraska statute requires the seller to deliver to the 
purchaser " ... a certificate of title with such assignment thereon 
as may be necessary to show title in the purchaser."12 It further 
requires the county clerk to whom the application for a new cer-
tificate is made to be satisfied that the " ... applicant is the owne,r 
of such motor vehicle ... " before issuing a new certificate of title 
in the applicant's name.13 
The assignment, alone, must place some type of title in the 
assignee, otherwise he would never be able to convince the county 
clerk that he is "the owner of such motor vehicle." It is sub-
mitted that the title acquired by the bare assignment should be 
sufficient to prove ownership in a replevin action. 
The present decision protects the purchaser from a thief and 
places the burden of loss on the insurer who has a valid assign-
ment of title to the car from the original owner. It is ultimately 
7 Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953). The 
dissent in the instant case based its argument heavily on that quotation. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149, 168, 65 
N.W.2d 542, 552 (1954). 
s Garlick v. McFarland. 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953). The 
court in this case found that where there was no assignment of the certi-
ficate of title, title did not pass. In the instant case there was a valid 
assignment of title. 
9 Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1952); Crawford v. General 
Exchange Ins. Corp., 119 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. App. 1953); Wilkison v. 
Grugeth, 223 Mo. App. 889, 20 S.W.2d 936 (1929). 
10 Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951). This was a replevin 
action in which the car was seized on an attachment from the original 
owner who was in temporary possession at the time of the seizure. Title 
was held to be in plaintiff-assignee even though he had obtained no new 
certificate of title. 
11 Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-18 (1953). 
12Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-104 (Reissue 1952). Emphasis supplied. 
13 Supra note 3. Emphasis supplied. 
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justifiable only on the ground that the procedure of obtaining a 
new title is so simple that the plaintiff should be required to com-
ply with it before bringing his action. 
Jerry C. Stirtz, '57 
